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Scholars and pundits alike have been 
qualifying our times as of “transition and 
turbulence”, “disorder” and “strategic 
unease”. Other concepts that recur in 
discussions on the present state of the 
world are ‘uncertainty’ and 
‘unpredictability’. They all seem to point 
to a world in flux. Let’s see what that 
means. 
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DIFFUSION OF POWER AND POWER 
SHIFT 
When you spread iron filings on a white sheet 
of paper, put a magnet below it and activate its 
poles, you get a neat pattern of well-ordered 
alignments. That is how the world map looked 
during the Cold War era, the era of the Bipolar 
World. Kinshasa was aligned on Washington. 
Luanda, just slightly below on the map, on 
Moscow. A transparent world. A world in 
which power was distributed among, and 
concentrated in, these two capitals. 
 
While the Bipolar World might have been 
intrinsically a rather dangerous place, its 
doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction 
paradoxically led to stability and predictability. 
As Ronald Steel put it: “In its perverted way, 
the Cold War was a force of stability” 
(Temptations of a Superpower). 
 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
implosion of the Soviet Union, disruptive 
forces which had been held in check by the 
‘ordering principle’ of the bipolar logic, were 
unleashed. The lid went off the kettle. Ethnic 
tensions and national rivalries erupted in 
violence all over the place (South-East Asia, 
Central-Africa, Caucasus, Balkans, to name 
just a few). With the Cold War gone, many 
countries, particularly in Africa, lost their 
strategic interest. Not much people cared 
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This paper sketches a macro-political view of 
the current state of the world. The focus will 
be on the forces at work in shaping our world, 
on the underlying trends and tendencies. Not 
on the ‘events’ whose meaning depends on the 
strategic framework in which you place them 
anyhow.  
 
In a world where power is shifting and a new 
but uncertain equilibrium is to be found, the 
State reclaim its own standing and strength, its 
full sovereignty, and becomes less dependent 
on and engaged with other States, in the 
process rewriting some of the rules of the 
game. The diffusion of power, the questioning 
of the rules-based system, the retreat from 
multilateralism, the growing isolationism and 
the absence of global leadership are as many 
facets of one single new reality: power politics 
is back. 
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anymore about where Kinshasa or Luanda 
were exactly located on the world map. 
 
Enter the United States, the ‘sole remaining 
superpower’ and with it a new era: that of the 
Unipolar World. In the early 90’ we see a 
weakened Russia (Yeltsin), a China on the rise 
but definitely not yet a power to be reckoned 
with and finally a European Union unable 
even to address the challenges in its own 
backyard (the Balkans). The resulting 
concentration of power in Washington made 
Bill Clinton say in the mid 9O’ that “if the US 
isn’t going to lead, the job will not be done”. 
And the US did indeed, by and large, show 
responsible leadership in world affairs during 
that period. 
 
But that period was short-lived, a ‘unipolar 
moment’ indeed, as it has been remembered. 
A new Russia woke up under a strong leader, 
Putin, whose power base, however, seems 
rather thin. China made strident advances on 
the world scene, particularly in economic 
terms but increasingly also in politico-military 
terms, thereby gaining in restrained self-
confidence. The United States, while 
remaining strong and resilient as always, lost 
some of its natural and unquestioned 
leadership role as it became more inward-
looking, a trend set in motion under the 
Obama-administration and apparently 
reinforced by Trump (‘apparently’ because 
with Trump one never knows for sure, as 
words and deeds seldom seem to match). And 
the European Union, while overcoming its 
multiple crises (euro, terrorism, refugees), 
prudently starts exploring some hard power 
avenues (PESCO in the military field) 
supplementing its unquestioned soft power 
assets. The EU Member States, for their part, 
have finally started increasing their defense 
budgets. 
 
Such is the somewhat uncertain world we 
currently live in, a world of powers – some 
rising, others slightly falling - in search of a 
new power-equation, a new balance that might 
but not necessarily will result in a stable 
Multipolar World. It is a world where as a 
result of the diffusion of power a lot of testing 
and teasing is going on, just to find out how 
far one can go without going too far (Georgia, 
Eastern Ukraine, North Korea, South China 
Sea). No outright confrontation among the big 
powers seems to be in the offing. What we 
witness is a big game of ‘smoke and mirrors’, 
adding to the confusion. It is a world of power 
shift, not intrinsically dangerous, but where 
uncertainty and unpredictability reign 
unabated. 
 
EROSION AND FRAGMENTATION OF 
NORMS AND VALUES 
The post-Cold War world order on which the 
big powers seemed to have implicitly if not 
explicitly agreed in the early 90’, was a rules-
based order. That order guaranteed a relative 
stability in the inter-State relations. 
International rules of conduct, among them 
the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, 
were felt not so much as external constraints 
on behavior than as factors of stability and 
predictability of behavior.  
 
Things changed some ten years ago. Core 
universal norms and values, meant to regulate 
international relations started being 
increasingly questioned, sometimes openly. 
Established principles regarding nuclear non-
proliferation (Iran, North-Korea), the non-use 
of force, the non-intervention in domestic 
affairs of other States and the respect of the 
territorial integrity of States (Iraq, Kosovo, 
Georgia, Ukraine), rules regarding the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict (Syria, 
Yemen) as well as basic principles of the law of 
the sea (South China Sea) were repeatedly 
broken. Emerging norms such as the one 
regarding the responsibility to protect (R2P) 
were abused (Libya). 
 
At the domestic level basic political rights (fair 
and free elections, fair trial) and fundamental 
freedoms (of assembly, press…) seem no 
longer unassailable (Turkey). Even within the 
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European Union some Member States openly 
question the validity of its foundational 
principles regarding democracy and the rule of 
law, such as the independence of the judiciary 
(Poland, Hungary). Presumably universal 
human rights are being “relativized” and 
“contextualized”. Respect for non-
discrimination principles (gender, race, religion, 
ethnicity…) and basic norms regarding the 
physical and moral integrity of the person are 
disregarded in many places (China, Myanmar, 
Zimbabwe). 
 
One should avoid exaggerating or dramatizing 
these developments. It is not as if the world 
has become in just a few decades an utterly 
nasty place. But some places in the world have 
definitely become nastier (Turkey, Egypt) as a 
rules-based order is being replaced by an 
interest-based system where the rights of States 
and citizens are made subservient to the (geo-
)political interests of governments seeking 
primarily to perpetuate their grip on power 
(Russia, China). What we witness, as regards 
norms and values, is a transition, in some 
countries at least, from a shared universalism 
(the UN managed ‘Universal Declarations’) 
towards a local particularism (so-called Asian 
or African values) where the State fixes its own 
cocktail of rules as it sees fit. There is an 
unquestionable parallel here with the post-
truth world of alternative facts, where the State 
(or individual) is allowed to fabricate its own 
cocktail of truths, those with which it feels 
most comfortable. 
 
THE RETURN OF THE STRONG STATE 
AND THE RESURGENCE OF 
BILATERALISM 
The State has never been away from 
international politics, contrary to what a trendy 
post-modern, post-Westphalian conception 
does want us to believe.  Indeed, the State has 
remained center stage on the international 
scene, even when in the meantime other actors 
besides International Organizations have 
joined that scene, including the group of so-
called non-state actors (in particular non-
governmental organizations and transnational 
corporations) or even anti-state actors (such as 
terrorist organizations or transnational criminal 
groups). But what is relatively new is the re-
emergence of the ‘strong’ State, the self-
assertive State, often linked to some kind of 
renewed or reinvented nationalism or 
patriotism. 
 
One consequence of the return of the strong, 
sovereign and independent State is the 
resurgence of classical bilateral diplomacy, no 
longer as a complement to multilateral 
diplomacy, but to some extent as its 
replacement. The strong State has indeed less 
appetite to be just a member of a larger, often 
bureaucratic organization where its voice gets 
diluted in majority decision making processes. 
The strong do-it-yourself State prefers to either 
simply act by itself (unilaterally) or else in a 
direct State-to-State relationship (bilaterally). 
 
William Hague, who joined the Cameron-
government in May 2010 as its new Foreign 
Secretary, soon packed out with his ‘New 
Bilateralism’, predicated on the premise that 
what one does alone, one does better (heir of 
the older more cooperative principle: ‘acting 
together when you can, alone when you must’). 
Trump too is distancing himself of 
multilateralism in favor of bilateralism. Witness 
his unpacking of the Trans Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) which he hopes to see replaced by a set 
of parallel bilateral Free Trade Agreements. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) too is up for a downward revision. 
Further signals pointing in the same direction 
are Trump’s refusal to nominate the US judge 
on the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, thus 
disrupting this important mechanism for the 
maintenance of an orderly world trade system, 
his decision to have the US withdraw from 
UNESCO-membership and his threat of 
diminishing the US share of obligatory UN 
budget contributions. 
 
Multilateralism is on the defensive. The 
concept of ‘effective multilateralism’, once a 
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key concept in European strategic thinking 
(Solana’s 2003 European Security Strategy) is 
today mocked as an oxymoron: to be effective, 
diplomacy must be bilateral, not multilateral. 
Experience teaches that classical international 
organizations (UN-style) are poor at real time 
problem solving and crisis management 
(witness the UN management of crises in 
Rwanda (2004), Darfur (2006), Sri Lanka 
(2009) and Myanmar today). International 
Organizations should conversely concentrate 
on what they are good at: treaty-making and 
long-term norm setting (Sustainable 
Development Goals, Climate Change). 
 
This shift away from classical multilateralism is 
also felt in the so-called ‘supranational’ 
governance of the European Union itself, 
where the increasingly prominent role of the 
European Council has given a boost to the 
‘intergovernmental’ method to the detriment 
of the orthodox so-called ‘community’ method 
centered around the Commission. As the EU 
had to face multiple crises hitting it 
simultaneously (euro, refugees, terrorism), the 
shift towards ‘intergovernmentalism’ was not 
just an option, but a necessity. It remained, 
however, a shift within (be it at the margins of) 
the existing Lisbon institutional framework. 
More significant is the fact that EU policies are 
also increasingly being shaped by European 
capitals, in particular Berlin and Paris, but this 
time outside of the institutional framework.  
 
These developments are compounded by 
different forms of Euroscepticism promoted 
by populist parties (France’s Front National, 
Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland, 
Hungary’s Jobbik Party, Finland’s True Finns) 
that openly question if not the existence itself 
of the EU, at least parts of it such as the Euro- 
or Schengen zone, thus contributing to its 
unraveling. Brexit – the outright withdrawal 
from the EU - will be remembered by history 
as a major break in multilateral diplomacy.  
 
One can either lament these developments or 
conversely try to understand them as reflecting 
a new political reality, one in which the strong 
State has come to reclaim its sovereign powers. 
 
GROWING ISOLATIONISM 
Let’s start with a platitude: we live in a complex 
world. Many people simply cannot catch up 
with the rapid technological developments 
(Artificial Intelligence, robotics, autonomous 
vehicles, big data-mining) nor with some of the 
new social norms (LGTBI, euthanasia, even 
abortion) which they find disruptive and 
unsettling. For them the world has become 
opaque. They feel disconnected from it and 
increasingly disoriented in it: estranged, 
disenfranchised and disempowered. They feel 
uncertain about their identity, their future. As a 
result, they turn inward within the narrow 
confines of a self-constructed, often self-
imagined world of Selfies, Whatsapps, 
Facebooks etc. Add to it the unequal and 
unfair distribution of globalization’s benefits 
(with income inequality its most visible 
expression), and you got all the ingredients of 
frustration and discontentment on which the 
populist politician fully capitalizes, often 
fueling these feelings through politics of fear 
and hatred. 
 
This inward movement is replicated at the 
State-level: States withdraw from the world at 
large within the domestic safety of their 
national borders, which take the shape of walls 
(Trump’s US-Mexico border) or fences 
(Hungary, Austria). The narrowly interpreted 
local interest comes first (Trump’s ‘America 
First’) and with it protectionism and anti-
globalism. As globalism turns into localism and 
cosmopolitan liberalism into populist 
illiberalism (Le Pen, Orban, Kaczynski) new 
forms of aggressive nationalism, sectarianism 
and xenophobia come to the fore, as we saw 
with the refugee crisis in Europe. 
 
With this new nationalism come identity 
politics. With the closing of the borders comes 
the closing of the minds. A strong, narrow and 
exclusive sense of belonging to a nation or a 
particular group carries with it the perception 
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of distance and divergence from other nations 
or groups. Within-nation solidarity fuels 
between-nation rivalry. Sometimes, moreover, 
these identities are mere political constructs 
(being Hutu or Tutsi in Burundi, being Roma 
in Slovakia, being Rohingya in Myanmar) based 
on, if not illusory or fabricated, at least grossly 
exaggerated beliefs in presumptively unique 
ethnic, religious or other characteristics. In 
many places, not just Europe (the Balkans), 
latent (Kashmir) or manifest (Myanmar) 
conflicts are sustained by the illusion of one 
such single, unique identity (Hindu vs. Muslim, 
Muslim vs. Christian, Sunni vs. Shia…). 
 
In parallel to the space-related withdrawal from 
the larger world into the smaller confines of 
the nation-state, there seems to be a time-
related withdrawal from the long-term (LT) 
and structural to the short-term (ST) and 
incidental, a phenomenon known under the 
pedant name of ‘short-termism’. Granted, 
humankind has always been prey to the so-
called Hyperbolic Discounting Fallacy, but 
short term thinking seems more prominent 
today than in the past. Necessary LT policies, 
focusing on structural inter-generational issues 
(such as climate change, food security, 
demographics, pension schemes) are sacrificed 
for the ST electoral advantage by giving in on 
the immediate gratification of a capricious 
electorate. The politician in general, and the 
populist politician in particular has a ST 
horizon: he works for the present and has no 
key to the future. Long term strategic interests 
or investments (such as energy infrastructure 
or major defense platforms) are neglected in 
favor of short term tactical advantages or pet 
projects. 
 
RELUCTANT GLOBAL LEADERSHIP 
It is no surprise that in an uncertain and 
unpredictable world where States turn inward 
and seem less concerned about the larger 
world around them, leaders feel less inclined to 
stand out and assume part of the responsibility 
that world governance would require. In a 
world where the big players are testing each 
other out to see what new power equation may 
emerge the prevailing attitude is one of wait-
and-see. Hence the sense of paralysis as regards 
global leadership. 
 
Contrast Clinton’s 1996 statement already 
mentioned (“if the US isn’t going to lead, the 
job will not be done”) with Obama’s 2015 
statement, referring to the Middle East turmoil, 
that “the people of these countries are going to 
have, you know, find their own way”. And 
Trump’s retreating from world leadership is no 
less clear: “we are not going to fight wars in 
countries we even don’t know the name of”. 
 
So, who is going to fill the gap left by a 
disengaging America? No other power seems 
willing (Russia, China) or able (EU) to step in. 
Not Russia, which is not primarily interested in 
securing peace and security in the world 
anyway, but rather in securing and extending its 
own power base, perhaps at the expense of 
other’s insecurity. Would China be prepared to 
do some of the global lifting? Not sure. 
Although under Xi there are clear signs 
pointing in the direction of a willingness to 
increasingly assume international 
responsibilities (climate change, UN 
peacekeeping), China remains a stern defender 
of the principle of non-interference in other 
countries’ business, naturally leading to a policy 
of non-engagement and therefore non-
leadership. North Korea has been for too long 
a case in point, but here too things are 
changing. And what about Europe? The EU as 
such seems to lack both the required political 
unity and political will to assume 
responsibilities beyond its immediate (Eastern 
and Southern) neighborhood. If not the EU, 
then perhaps some European capitals: but 
London has outflanked itself through Brexit 
and Paris, although naturally inclined to engage 
internationally (Libya, Mali, Syria), cannot do it 
on its own, while Merkel’s Germany will most 
probably continue to give priority to European 
unity, perhaps in partnership with Macron, 
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including in the field of defense now that 
Europe can no longer outsource its security 
across the Atlantic. 
 
We could perhaps try to look for leadership 
roles at other advanced countries such as 
Japan, Canada or Australia, but not much 
seems yet to come from them. At some stage 
emerging countries such as Brazil, India and 
South Africa, either separate or as a group 
(within the BRICS), seemed promising 
candidates for leadership, but we have come to 
understand that the BRICS concept is an 
artifice rather than a genuine power to come. 
So-called pivotal states, great countries to be 
reckoned with such as Turkey, Pakistan and 
Egypt seem more to be in need of responsible 
leadership than in a position to provide for it. 
 
A similar retreat in leadership is apparent at the 
level of global governance structures such as 
the G7 (G8 minus Russia) and G20 that were 
specifically meant to provide for leadership 
over and above individual countries. But as of 
late their clout has been fading away so much 
so that we seem to have landed in Ian 
Bremmer’s G-Zero world defined as “a world 
order in which no single country or durable 
alliance of countries can meet the challenge of 
global leadership”. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE RETURN OF POWER 
POLITICS 
The diffusion of power, the questioning of the 
rules-based system, the retreat from 
multilateralism, the growing isolationism and 
the absence of global leadership are all facets 
of one single reality, they are  convergent 
threads that mutually reinforce and explain 
each other: in a world where power is shifting 
and a new but uncertain equilibrium is to be 
found, the State must reclaim its own standing 
and strength, become less dependent on and 
engaged with others, in the process rewriting 
some of the rules of the game. Somehow, we 
seem to have come back to what some have 
called the billiard-ball world, a system of self-
contained States playing a power game: power 
politics is back. 
 
“What we are seeing” – writes Paul Wilkinson 
– “is evidence that, far from witnessing a 
strengthening of multilateral institutions and 
global political integration, what we are really 
seeing is the enduring reality of our system of 
sovereign independent states: rivalry and 
conflict between the major and even the 
medium and minor powers; continuing effects 
of the security dilemma; and perpetuation of 
the balance of power as a central feature of the 
system, both at global and regional levels” 
(International Relations, Oxford, 2006, p. 27). 
 
As the post-Cold War, rules-based world order 
is increasingly and more openly questioned, 
people realize that history has not come to an 
end, indeed that history is reversible and, 
collaterally, that security should not be taken 
for granted nor the steady progress of 
democracy and the rule of law to be 
guaranteed.  
 
Nations are wakening out of the soft slumber 
in which the fall of the Berlin wall and the 
implosion of the Soviet Empire brought them.  
The much prized so-called ‘peace-dividend’ has 
been short-lived. What the Putins, Erdogans, 
Kim Jung Uns and Trumps of this world are 
telling us, all in their own way, is that 
complacency is a self-defeating recipe and that 
the time has come to stop dreaming, to get 
real. Diplomacy is no charity. 
 
‘Realpolitik’ is back. ‘Power Politics’ got new 
credentials. ‘Strategic Thinking’ is in the lift 
again. All this can be seen in the shifting 
vocabulary of diplomatic discourse: power vs. 
authority; hard power vs. soft power; power 
projection; containing vs. engaging; 
constraining vs. influencing; disincentives 
(sanctions) vs. incentives; vital or enlightened 
interests vs. values; effectivity vs. legitimacy. 
With this renewed vocabulary comes a shift 
from declarative policies to action-oriented 
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strategies, or to put it in Stalin’s words, from 
the “algebra of declarations” to the “practical 
arithmetic”. 
 
POSTSCRIPTUM 
A macro-political analysis of the kind 
presented here necessarily proceeds by making 
some simplifications and generalizations. 
Before closing, let me very briefly and on a 
more personal note, make some qualifications 
and self-critical remarks in this regard: 
  
- On the Diffusion of Power. I have 
implicitly assumed the EU to be, or rather 
to possibly become part of the ‘great 
power’ game. Perhaps that is not correct, 
and also misleading. Does the EU see itself 
as a great power? I doubt it. And I doubt 
even more that outsiders see it as a great 
power. One could make a strong case, I 
think, that only States can be great powers, 
not International Organizations (IO), even 
when recognizing the hybrid character of 
the EU, neither a State (which it will never 
be) nor (no longer) an IO, but more State 
than IO. This question is not without 
importance in terms of expectation 
management: if you (over-)sell the EU as a 
‘great power’ and don’t live up to the 
challenge, as is to be expected, the cost in 
terms of credibility will be larger than 
whatever benefit gained by the self-labeling 
as ‘great power’. 
 
- I have explicitly stated that the ongoing 
power-shift forth and back, up and down, 
among the ‘great powers’ may, but need 
not necessarily have to result in a Multi 
Polar world order. I could imagine, for 
instance, that we end up with a Bipolar 
World, perhaps by default: a great Europe 
not being a power, a powerful Russia not 
being great. A Bipolar World, that is, with 
the US and China as players, engaged 
perhaps in a mildly cooperative rather than 
starkly competitive game. The ongoing 
power-shift could also result in a messy 
situation, one of muddling through. As 
they say, success in politics is not 
perfection; it is going from failure to failure 
without loss of enthusiasm. Is a ‘dark 
scenario’ to be excluded, with tension 
accumulating to the point of great power 
armed conflict? No, it is not, but unlikely 
for the time horizon we can currently 
oversee. 
 
- Neither have I said anything on how we 
will go from here to there. Most probably 
this won’t be just a linear process. It is 
quite possible that on the road to a possible 
Multi Polar world order intermediate, 
perhaps temporary, structures or processes 
(BRICS-style, or recent QUAD-style, i.e. 
US, India, Japan, Australia) will contribute, 
or conversely hamper, the shaping of the 
final formula, if final formula there ever 
will be. 
 
- On the Erosion of Norms. When I spoke 
about the transition, as regards norms and 
values, from a shared universalism towards 
a local particularism I have entered a 
minefield of contested East-West positions. 
For one, the existence itself of so-called 
universal values is a very Western concept; 
the Asian concept of values is indeed much 
more particularistic. The Chinese, for 
instance, are at ease with the belief that 
what is right for China is not necessarily 
right for the world, and vice versa. 
 
- Similar ethno-cultural considerations could 
be made as regards the Return of the 
Strong State and the Withdrawal from 
Long-Term to Short-Term thinking. 
Chinese communitarianism (the interests of 
the community prevail on the rights of the 
individual) almost logically implies the State 
to be strong. Being strong is its natural 
state; so there is not much to return to 
here. A similar remark can be made as 
regards long-term thinking. The very long 
history of China has a direct effect on how 
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the Chinese scale time: what we consider to 
be a long term (say 25 years), is for the 
Chinese just their short term. So no 
exceptional foresight is involved in the 
Chinese capacity for what we in the West see 
as long-term planning. It’s just in their genes, 
or better: memes. 
 
A final self-critical point concerns the dynamical 
dimension of the story presented here. Power 
shifting, norms getting eroded, the strong State 
returning, isolationism growing, power politics 
being on the way back… An easy objection to 
all of this is that we’ve been there before. 
Isolationism? Has this not been a recurrent 
feature of US foreign policy? The return of the 
(strong) State: but the State was never gone 
anyway, and the Chinese State, as we saw, has 
always been a strong one. The return of power-
politics? Only the naïve (European) could have 
thought that international politics could do 
away with power. Such objections are in 
themselves unobjectionable indeed, but they 
miss a point. One can always refuse to see the 
forest and stick to its trees. 
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